In Northern Chile, the demand for electricity is expected to grow at a 5% annual rate over the coming years. The primary electricity consumers in the region are mining companies which, due to the characteristics of their activities, have a flat (constant) demand profile. The main energy consumers usually agree (Power Purchase Agreements, PPA) on long-term supply commitments at a fixed price, consistent with stable demand needs. Certain Non-Conventional Renewable Energies (ERNC), such as wind and solar, are or will be competitive to the in Northern Chile, but they do not adapt well to constant demand. CSP technology with thermal energy storage adapts better to the demand profile for Northern Chile but, currently, it is noncompetitive when compare with a conventional PPA.
Introduction
Northern Chile area is characterized by a significantly high solar resource, DNI over 3 MWh/ (m 2 ·year) [1] and a growing electricity, expected to double its size by 2025. Fig. 1 . Electricity Demand in the North Electrical System SING. Source CNE [2] Most of the energy supplied to the large consumers, mining companies is made within the frame of long term Power Purchase Agreements (PPAs), being the cost of the energy on the range of USD 100/MWh to USD 120/MWh. This figure, even taking into account the high DNI in Northern Chile, cannot be reached using CSP technology.
Incorporating renewable energy into the energy matrix has advantages such as: increasing the security of supply, reducing emissions of greenhouse gases and the developing a local industry, therefore, incentives to narrow the gap have been introduced in different countries.
In Chile, a bidding process under CORFO [3], providing soft financing and an upfront grant, is the mechanism that has enabled a first CSP plant to start construction and the creation of a pipe-line of projects. The process was supported by a technical assistance financed by Inter-American Development Bank [4] Atacamatec: Large scale development of solar energy in the North of Chile. One objective of the TA was finding and structuring a feasibility enhancement mechanism under market conditions and with no further subsidy or public intervention.
Methodology
A probabilistic analysis was used to evaluate the gap narrowing effect of financial incentives. The actual conventional energy expected PPA price was modeled as having a normal probability distribution, with a 95% probability of being between 100 USD/MWh and 120 USD/MWh. The values were normalized with the average PPA price, so equivalent to a normal distribution being =1 and =5.1. A simplified financial model was developed to calculate the PPA price for two archetypical CSP projects using parabolic trough and central tower technologies. The main assumptions of the financial model are summarized in Table 1 (all calculations in real terms, no inflation considered). Senior loan interest rate 6.5%
Senior loan repayment period (years) 20
Senior loan payment holidays (years) 2
The model was subject to a Monte Carlo analysis, randomly varying some key technical parameters ( Table 2 ) within reasonably expected ranges. The result is a probability distribution of the expected PPA price for each technology. The comparison of the probability distributions for the conventional PPA price and the solar PPA price yields the probability of a CSP project's PPA being under the reference for off-takers; thus, the probability of the CSP plant of being profitable with a competitive price.
The financial model was then modified to include financial incentives:
A soft loan that will cover a certain amount of the total loan required by the project.
A grant, which can be structured three different ways:
1. An upfront grant that will cover a certain amount of the total equity of the project 2. An upfront grant that will cover a certain amount of the total investment cost (CAPEX) 3. A scheduled grant that will be used to amortize part or all of the loan, and will be released after the first and second year of operation of the plant
The modified model was subject to a Monte Carlo analysis, randomly varying key financial parameters (Table 3) within reasonably expected ranges. The result is a set of probability distributions (for each technology, and for each grant structure). The use of financial incentives will lower the average price but also increase the dispersion of the results. The comparison of the probability distributions yields the probability of a CSP project's being competitive and profitable.
Results

Base case
The average price for a CSP parabolic trough plant is 1.5 times higher than the average reference price, and the probability of the plant being competitive is almost null. Financial incentives enlarge that area, and push downwards the average value of the distribution. 
Impact of grant amount and grant structure
As shown Fig. 3 , a grant will increase the probability of CSP being competitive. Three ways of structuring the grant and their respective results for both the parabolic trough and tower are shown. In both cases, an upfront grant for equity will rapidly make CSP more competitive, but common practice in structured finance will not allow large grants in this concept. Both an upfront grant for CAPEX and a Scheduled grant will make CSP more competitive, and the probability increases with the percentage of CAPEX granted. Fig. 3 . Impact of the Grant amount in the probability of CSP PPA price being lower than conventional, for a CSP tower
Impact of Soft loan amount
A soft loan on the project also lowers the PPA price for CSP and makes it more competitive. The determining factor that affects the effectiveness of the soft loan is the size of it. Fig. 4 shows that a larger loan will lead to a larger probability that the price of CSP is less than the market PPA price.
Black lines in Fig. 4 reveal the crossed effect of the soft loan and the grants. If both mechanisms are applied at the same time, small soft loans will have a higher impact when the grant is Scheduled or used to reduce CAPEX, but large soft loans are synergic with grants for Equity. Fig. 4 . Impact of the Soft loan amount in the probability of CSP PPA price being lower than conventional, for a CSP tower 
Impact of other Soft loan parameters
While other factors affect the effectiveness of a soft loan, their effect is small, no relevant effect on the probability within the ranges studied. Those factors include interest rate, payment holiday, and repayment period of the soft loan. Figures 5-7 will show their effects on the probability of CSP PPA price being lower than conventional. 
Conclusions and recommendations
All the financial incentives analyzed lead to a positive impact on the competitiveness of CSP in the market. Both a soft loan and a grant will increase the probability of CSP PPA price being lower than conventional. The effect of the incentives is similar for both CSP parabolic trough and tower technologies.
The grant, when structured to reduce equity, has a stronger impact than when it reduces CAPEX or is scheduled and used to amortize loan. That also indicates that other ways to reduce the cost of equity capital (outside the scope of this paper) would also have a strong impact on the likelihood that CSP would become more competitive.
Finally, the way the grant is spent affects the soft loan impact. If the grant is spent to reduce equity, the effect of the soft loan is stronger for large loan amounts, but weaker for small loan amounts, when compared with the same loan when the grant is spent to reduce CAPEX or scheduled to amortize loan. An equilibrium point appears when the soft loan covers 40% of the CAPEX.
